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The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More than Forty 
Years Later a Proposal for the Future 
Javier Arteaga∗
I. INTRODUCTION – THE YEAR WAS 1966
United States’ armed forces, 250,000 soldiers strong, conduct raids in 
efforts to capture, wound, and kill the Viet Cong.1  Meanwhile, Americans 
hold demonstrations throughout the homeland in protest.2  Martin Luther 
King, Jr. leads a civil-rights march in Chicago, Illinois, during which he is 
struck by a rock thrown from an angry white mob.3  Actor Ronald Reagan, a 
Republican, is elected Governor of California,4 and Lyndon B. Johnson is 
President of the United States.5  “The Man Trap,” the first episode of the 
science fiction television series Star Trek, airs,6 and the Beatles play their 
annual American concert in New York’s Shea Stadium on a makeshift stage 
placed over second base.7  The U.S. Supreme Court rules in Miranda v. 
Arizona8 that the police must inform criminal suspects of their rights before 
proceeding to question them.9  The Freedom of Information Act10 is enacted 
into law.  The year was 1966.11  Also in this colorful, yet dark, year in 
American history, Cuban nationals immigrated to the United States in 
* J.D., Florida International University, College of Law, 2008.  I would like to first thank my 
parents, Ana O. and Luis E. Arteaga.  It was their efforts and love that figuratively and literally brought 
this paper to life.  I would also like to thank my grandparents whose difficult decisions brought my 
family to the United States; Professor Troy E. Elder for continuous guidance; the Law Review staff at 
the Florida International University College of Law for providing the opportunity to write freely on this 
topic; the Class of 2008 for inspiring me; and Tanya R. Baur and Diana Arteaga for supporting me.   
 1
 U.S. Strength Rises to 250,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1966, at 3.    
2
 Douglas Robinson, Vietnam Protest Snarls Times SQ, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1966, at 1. 
3
 Gene Roberts, Rock Hits Dr. King as Whites Attack March in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
1966, at 1.  
4
 Lawrence Davis, Reagan Elected by a Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1966, at 1. 
5
 Johnson Greets ’66 with Family; Spends Most of First Day at His Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
1966, at 21. 
6
 Ron Wertheimer, Captain’s Log: We’re Back and, Boy, Are we Young, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
1998, at E25. 
7
 Paul L. Montgomery, Beatles Bring Shea to a Wild Pitch of Hysteria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
1966, at 40. 
8
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9
 Id.   
10
 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). 
 11 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (landmark events of 1966).   
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record numbers,12 and on November 2, 1966, Congress enacted, and Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson signed, the Cuban Adjustment Act (“CAA”) into 
law.13
November 2, 2006, marked the 40th Anniversary of the establishment 
of the CAA.  The Act today reads as follows:  
[T]he status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who 
has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States sub-
sequent to January 1, 1959, and has been physically present in the 
United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney 
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may pre-
scribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if 
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is el-
igible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United 
States for permanent residence . . . .  The provisions of this Act . . . 
shall be applicable to the spouse and child of any alien described in 
this subsection, regardless of their citizenship and place of birth, who 
are residing with such alien in the United States . . . .14
Since the establishment of the CAA over forty years ago, Cubans have been 
granted unparalleled access to the U.S.15  Known as America’s “special fa-
vorites,” “self-imposed political exiles,” and “consumer refugees,” Cubans 
are the only group granted such “special privileges” and “favorable immi-
gration laws.”16
The favoritism is best illustrated through an anecdote.17  Five miles off 
the coast of Miami, Florida, a vessel carrying 131 Haitian nationals who 
had fled Haiti stopped and picked up two Cubans at sea.  They were near 
death because their boat had capsized.  When the vessel arrived in Miami, 
the Haitians were all sent back to Haiti.  The two Cubans were granted 
 12 Kennedys Conduct Hearing on Cubans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1966, at 9 (indicating that 
300,000 Cubans awaited permanent residency in the U.S. in 1966).  
 13 Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at 15.  
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). For further clarification, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an alien as “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).  The term 
“admitted” with respect to aliens means “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspec-
tion and authorization by an immigration officer.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13)(A).   
 15 See Berta Esperanza Hernánadez-Truyol, On Becoming the Other: Cubans, Castro, And Elian – 
a LatCritical Analysis, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 687, 708 (2001) [hereinafter The Other].  
 16 See Alberto J. Pérez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cu-
bans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 437, 437 (2004) [hereinafter 
No Foot].  
 17 See Joyce A. Hughes, Flight From Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (2000) [hereinafter 
Flight].  
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access to the U.S. and after one year were eligible to receive green cards 
solely based on their nationality.18
Ordinarily, to qualify for admission to the U.S., an immigrant19 must fit 
within one of the various categories established by Congress.20  If an immi-
grant fits within a class he or she will be given a visa, a pass obtained at a 
U.S. consulate office outside the U.S. issued by the American government 
for the purpose of entering the U.S.21  The system provides two opportuni-
ties to examine the alien’s eligibility.  First, while abroad, and second, on 
U.S. soil by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).22  A nonim-
migrant alien, one who enters the U.S. not intending to achieve permanent-
resident status, e.g., a tourist, who later intends to permanently reside in the 
U.S., may adjust status under INA § 245.23  If an alien enters the U.S. with-
out a visa, he or she is inadmissible, subject to removal from the U.S., and 
if removed from the U.S., barred from reentering for a period of ten years.24
The reason for highlighting these general procedural processes is because 
Cubans, under the CAA, are exempt from the visa process.25  Cubans upon 
arrival in the U.S. without a visa may still achieve permanent residency in 
the U.S.26  All they need is the CAA.  The bill allows “Cubans who have 
been living in the United States . . . to obtain full residence.  This in turn 
will qualify them for eventual citizenship.”27  The CAA when enacted also 
applied retroactively up to thirty months; thus, those Cubans who arrived in 
the U.S. after June 2, 1964, could “waive half the waiting period of five 
years that is required for citizenship.”28  Additionally, the CAA applies to all 
 18 Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ¿Mirando Por Los Ojos De Don Quijote o Sancho 
Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 902 (2001) [hereinafter Don Quijote].  
 19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006) (the term “immi-
grant,” as defined by Congress in the INA, is every alien who does not fit within the classes of non-
immigrants). 
 20 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 239 (4th ed., 
Foundation Press 2005) (1992) [hereinafter Legomsky]. 
 21 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(16), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(16) (2006). 
 22 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 1-1 IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 1.03 (C) (I) (2006).
 23 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1245 (2006) (the CAA is a footnote of 
this section of the INA). 
 24 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(7) (2006). 
 25 See Peter Slevin, Policy on Cuban Immigration Tangled in Contradiction, MIAMI HERALD,
May 23, 1993, at 22A 
 26 Id.
 27 Senate Approves Residence Status for Cuba Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1966, at 7.  
 28 See id.; Adjustment of Status for Cuban Refugees: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the 
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 11-20 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(Rep. Ball did not consider the waiver of 30 months to be a “large consideration.”  The 5-year period 
was implemented to give aliens a reasonable opportunity to adjust and assimilate to life in the U.S.  This 
period allowed an alien to “learn the ways of this country, and in that way to make himself or herself 
better qualified to assume the responsibilities of citizenship.  The Hon. Ball, after explaining the necessi-
ty of the 5-year period, transitioned to why Cubans do not need the 5-year period, and never gave an 
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future Cuban refugees, and continues to serve its favorable and expedited 
immigration benefits on Cubans in the U.S.29
This immigration dichotomy, i.e., the distinction made between Cu-
bans and all other groups, as well as the present realities and future of the 
CAA are the focuses of this comment.  Part II of this comment takes a look 
at the events that led to the enactment of the CAA.30  Part III considers the 
effects of the CAA over the past 40 years based on the considerations and 
statements made by the Members of Congress that created the CAA.31  Part 
IV proposes balancing the benefits of the CAA by including groups similar-
ly situated to Cubans, particularly Haitians.32  Part V concludes this com-
ment by summarizing how to eliminate the “preferential” treatment of Cu-
bans by recognizing that Cubans and Haitians are inseparable for immigra-
tion purposes.33
II. BACKGROUND – SUPPORT AND CRITICISM OF THE CAA
A. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Speech and the Congressional Hearings 
Regarding Adjustment of Status for Cuban Refugees 
On October 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed the na-
tion with regard to changes in America’s immigration policies.34  The presi-
dential speech was given from Liberty Island, home of the Statue of Liber-
ty, and at the base of an American flag about 75 yards from the statue.35  A 
explanation.  “It would seem to us . . . that Cubans nationals who have been in this country for 3 or 4 
years, even though they may have been here under parole status, would have probably acquired as much 
knowledge of the United States, as if they had come in under an immigrant visa in the first instance.  So 
there would seem to us to be a slight equity in having this date run from the time in which their first 
entry was made.”  The Hon. Ball did, however, mention that this was a matter to be argued).  
 29 See id.; Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
1966, at 12 (originally left open to apply in the future to an estimated 4,000 Cubans that were brought 
by airlift to Miami on a monthly basis).   
 30 See infra Part II. 
 31 See infra Part III. 
 32 See infra Part IV. 
 33 See infra Part V.  This comment is not meant in any way to advocate against the special treat-
ment of Cubans; however, it will expose forty years of trends and consequences that are no longer 
supported by the initial rationales behind the Act.  Instead, the Act now is supported by a new set of 
rationales.  Additionally, the need for expansion of the CAA, based on my research and personal expe-
riences with how the Act plays-out in the real world, is a result of the new rationales supporting the 
CAA.  I am the son of Cuban immigrants.  My mother arrived in the U.S. in 1980 as part of the Mariel 
Boatlift.  She continues to save the slip of paper issued to her by the U.S. government that indicates her 
arrival and acceptance to the U.S.  My parents and I, as well as a large portion of my community and 
law school, have benefited from the special privileges; however, I do not feel a selfish need to keep the 
focus of the treatment solely on Cubans.  My position, which I intend to explain throughout this com-
ment, calls for increased access to all similarly-situated immigrant groups.   
 34 Robert B. Semple Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 1. 
 35 Id.
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more patriotic setting could not have been scripted.  The President an-
nounced that he 
[opened] the nation’s gates to all Cubans who wanted to escape the re-
gime of Fidel Castro and ‘seek freedom’ in the United States . . . .  
[T]hat it was in the spirit of America’s ‘tradition as an asylum for the 
oppressed’ that he was telling ‘the people of Cuba that those who seek 
refuge [in the United States] will find it.’36
President Johnson was responding directly to a claim made by then-Prime 
Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, just days earlier.37  First, on September 28, 
1965, and then again on September 30, 1965, Castro announced there was 
no penalty or consequence for Cuban nationals who wished to flee the isl-
and of Cuba for the U.S.38  The diplomatic feud that ensued between the 
two governments led to President Johnson’s approval of the most liberal 
U.S. immigration policies in over forty years.39
On August 10, 11, and 17 of 1966, the spirit of President Johnson’s 
speech carried-over to a set of congressional hearings conducted by a sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary.  The reason for dis-
cussion was the various “views of the immediately concerned departments 
of government on the question of authorizing adjustment of status for Cu-
ban refugees.”40  Adjustment of status, as previously mentioned, is the pro-
cedural process for achieving legal and permanent immigration standing in 
the U.S.; but, generally a visa is still required.41
However, in 1966, the only means for a Cuban refugee in the U.S. to 
obtain a permanent visa was by leaving the U.S. and applying at an Ameri-
can consulate abroad, usually in Mexico or Canada.42  According to the 
Hon. George Ball, a participant in the August 10, 1966, hearing, this proce-
dure had “not proved satisfactory” for three practical reasons.43  First, “the 
trip abroad is costly for many Cuban refugees; for many the cost is prohibi-
tive.”44  An estimated 300,000 Cuban refugees were present in the U.S. in 
36
 Id. (alteration in original). 
37
 THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2008) (Fidel Castro held the position of Prime Minister of Cuba from February 1959 until 
February 1976 when that position was abolished.  He later took office as President). 
38
 Robert B. Semple, Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 4. 
39 See id.
40
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of Rep. Feighan).  
41
 See DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A 
NUTSHELL 112-113 (5th ed., Thomson West 2005); Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 
1245 (2006). 
42
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4; Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
1966, at 15.  
43
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4; Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1966, at 12. 
44
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4. 
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1966.45  “Only about 70,000 of the 300,000 . . . could afford this.”46
Second, American consulates abroad are too understaffed to handle claims 
by persons outside the local consulate district; thus, only a small percentage 
of applicants were being considered and a smaller percentage were granted 
visas.47  Third, admission into other countries was not often granted for the 
purpose of applying for an American visa from within said country.48
Other more politically loaded concerns were expressed by the sub-
committee while debating the “strongly supported”49 bill that created an 
expedited process and means for Cuban refugees to adjust their status to 
permanent residency.50  For example, the U.S. desired to “play a full and 
sympathetic role as a country of asylum for refugees from communism, 
whether the country of flight is located in the Eastern or Western Hemis-
phere.”51  Theoretically, every Cuban who fled Cuba for the U.S. inevitably 
became one more vote that favored a free, capitalist world.52  Furthermore,  
[American] policy . . . is one of opposition to the Communist regime 
in Cuba.  Our goal and strong desire is that Cuba shall be freed from 
Communist domination and shall return again to the free world . . . .  
[T]his special help to Cubans . . . in no way reflects any change in our 
attitude or any lessening in our determination.53
The bill in no way was meant to indicate that the U.S. supported or recog-
nized Castro’s regime as legitimate.54  The subcommittee found it essential 
that this “basic consideration be fully clarified and emphasized . . . [to en-
sure no] public misunderstanding . . . .”55  Immigration reform provided 
relief to the Cuban people while maintaining a stringent anti-Castro posi-
tion.56  “[The] decision to grant citizenship to the refugees should not be 
understood as an implicit concession that the . . . [Cuban] Government [is] 
more or less permanent.”57  Less political rationales for the CAA were pep-
pered throughout the subcommittee’s hearings, but the tension between 
Cuba and the U.S. could not be denied.  “This subcommittee appreciates the 
45
 See Robert B. Semple, Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigra-
tion Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 1. 
46
 Id. (enactment of the CAA meant Cubans could become permanent residents of the U.S. by 
simply filling out an application. “The usual $25 fee for changing immigration status was waived.”). 
47
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4. 
48
 Id.
49
 Richard Eder, Ball Urges Immigrant Status for Cuban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1966, at 
12. 
50
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 4. 
51
 Id.
52
 See Changes, infra note 80, at 234.  
53
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 4.  
54
 Id.
55
 Id. at 5. 
56
 See id.
57
 Eder, supra note 49, at 12.  
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assurances that . . . have been given today that adjustment of status for these 
Cuban refugees which the Department recommends be authorized, in no 
way reflects or infers a change in basic U.S. policy toward the Communist 
occupation of Cuba.”58
In a letter written by Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark on Au-
gust 4, 1966, to the Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, Mr. Clark detailed other justifications for exempting Cubans 
“from the proscription against natives of other Western Hemisphere coun-
tries as to eligibility for adjustment of immigration status.”59  First, an esti-
mated 164,000 Cubans had arrived in the U.S. in a one-month period.60
Upon arrival in the U.S., the Cubans remained in an “indefinite and nonre-
sident status [due to] the upheaval in their native country causing them to 
flee and remain in the United States.”61  Second, the U.S. severed all diplo-
matic ties with Cuba on January 3, 1961.62  This was a decision made by 
former-President Dwight D. Eisenhower after a series of failed negotiations 
with Cuba over sugar quotas and the increase of Cuban relations with the 
Soviet Union.63  Since then, it has been impossible for Cubans in Cuba to 
apply for an immigration visa for the purpose of seeking permanent resi-
dency in the U.S.64  Third, many professionally-trained Cubans who “would 
be a credit to this country” were prevented from gaining professional em-
ployment in the U.S. due to statutes that required full citizenship or a decla-
ration of intent of citizenship before practicing certain professions (e.g., 
dentists, lawyers, physicians, and teachers).65  “Enactment of this legislation 
would remove many bars to the self-sufficiency of Cuban refugees” in the 
U.S.66  Fourth, the financial burden on the American government, with re-
58
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 10 (statement of Rep. Feighan, addressing the letter of Deputy 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark).  
59
 Id. at 8 (several letters were presented as evidence during the hearings.  They were read aloud 
to the Subcommittee members, and then discussed).  
60
 Id. at 9.   
61
 Id.
62 See id.
63
 JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, TO MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION: CUBA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
23-25 (Harvard University Press 1989). Sugar quotas were constantly in debate between the U.S. and 
Cuba.  After Castro took control of Cuba, he eliminated the quotas “for the sake of independence.”   In 
1960, the U.S. attempted to improve relations with Cuba, but “the Castro regime virtually paralyzed the 
negotiations with various excuses and evasions which were designed to gain time until” a pact was 
signed with the Soviets.  On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower cut the sugar quota by 95 percent, and 
three days later, on July 9, 1960, the Soviet Union agreed to buy from Cuba all the sugar that the U.S. 
refused to purchase.  In December 1960, the U.S. sugar quota was fixed at zero.  On January 1, 1961, 
Cuba restricted the personnel of the American embassy in Havana as the U.S. “broke off diplomatic 
relations” with Cuba. 
64
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 9. 
65
 Id.
66
 Id.   
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gards to unsettled Cubans, would be reduced.67  These rationales or con-
cerns will later be discussed in Part III of this comment in light of the past 
forty years of political stalemate and change. 
Perhaps the most interesting dialogue took place between the Hon. 
George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, and Rep. Frank L. Chelf from Ken-
tucky.   
Mr. Chelf:  Mr. Secretary, I listened very carefully to your testimony.  
I would like to ask you again, for the record, just to be sure, outside of 
the humanitarian feature that is involved here, do you sincerely be-
lieve that this legislation is in the best interests of the United States?  
That is the thing that I am interested in.  I want to do all that I can to 
help others, but the point that worries me—you see, we have helped 
100 nations and we have given 122 billions of our dollars away, only 
to have the fellows overseas now, who are fat and sleek and rich, to 
take our own dollars and demand our gold out of Fort Knox.  Now, I 
know it is going on and everybody else knows it, but will this help us 
here? 
. . . . 
Mr. Ball:  We would be extending to [the Cubans] the privilege of liv-
ing in a free society.  This is consistent with the principles that we 
have followed in our dealing with nations around the world, to en-
courage freedom, to encourage resistance to totalitarianism.  We have 
a feeling that this would be a contribution to creating a consistent vi-
sion of the United States of a nation that practices what it preaches 
and which extends to people who are hard pressed under totalitarian 
regimes the possibility of becoming useful citizens of the United 
States working toward the general cause of freedom. 
Mr. Chelf:  Being very much interested in it, and to the extent that I 
paid my own way out of my own pocketbook, I made a trip, incognito, 
down to Florida in April of this year.  I had been hearing about the 
Cubans and how many we had and what they were doing, and all that 
sort of thing . . . .  [N]o newspaper, nowhere, at no time knew I was 
there.  I got some good information and I just want to say this to you: I 
think that you are exactly right, for the very simple reason I saw law-
yers and doctors and other professional men working at menial tasks, 
something that was foreign to them but yet they had mastered to the 
best of their ability that trade.  I saw with my own eyes firsthand these 
people and I talked to them in my broken Spanish as best I could, and 
67
 Id.  In Part III of this comment these rationales will be discussed in light of the past 40 years of 
political stalemate and change. 
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let me tell you something, I was very much impressed with them.  
They are very fine people and they come from good stock.68
The debate continued, but the essence of the conversation is summarized by 
a point made by the Hon. George Ball.  He found that the adjustment of the 
immigration status of Cuban refugees was “necessary.”  “If we do not take 
this step . . . [it] is going to be a pretty unedifying spectacle to many nations 
of the world.  And many people are going to doubt whether the United 
States really means what is says.”69
Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, then Attorney General of the United 
States, also backed the bill.70  “Such legislation would be a humane 
postscript to the message formulated by our Government and voiced by the 
President,”71 said the Attorney General while referencing President John-
son’s speech from Liberty Island.  However, the Attorney General noted 
that the adjustment of status was not automatic.72  It was to be voluntary on 
the part of the Cubans, and subject to the discretion of the Attorney Gener-
al.73
B. Statistical Background 
At this point, some statistical background will help clarify why former 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Congress found it necessary to install the 
Cuban refugee reform laws.  On August 17, 1966, the Hearings continued.  
This time representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (“Department”) were in the hot seat.74  According to the Department, 
there were three stages in Cuban migration to the U.S.75   
The first period was January 1959 – October 1962.  On January 2, 
1959, Fidel Castro marched into Havana and proclaimed, “[t]he revolution 
begins now.”76  At this stage, no one could predict the future of the regime, 
but as the Cuban government began to enact “agrarian reform laws and 
other measures to confiscate private enterprises,” there was an increase of 
Cubans seeking asylum to the United States.77  The years 1960-1962 saw 
more confiscations by the Cuban government, and the eventual manage-
ment and control of these properties.78  At this stage, professionals and 
68
 Id. at 11-12.  
69
 Id. at 13.   
70
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 31. 
71
 Id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 49. 
75
 Id.
76
 DOMÍNGUEZ, supra note 63, at 16. 
77
 Hearings, supra note 28, at 50. 
78
 Id.
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technicians, those formerly in control, left Cuba for the U.S.79  These per-
sons have been called the “Golden Exiles” for their high level of education, 
political and business connections, and entrepreneurial know-how.80  Dip-
lomatic tensions grew to a destructive stage in 1961 when the U.S. govern-
ment was forced to sever its relations with Cuba; meanwhile, Cubans con-
tinued to flee the island.81  An estimated 215,000 refugees fled Cuba during 
this three year period.82
The second period was October 1962 – October 1965.  Cuban migra-
tion to the U.S. was brought to a standstill for three years after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in October of 1962.83  After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the vast 
majority of Cuban refugees already in the U.S. were in Miami, and an esti-
mated 68,000 were receiving financial assistance from the U.S. govern-
ment.84  During this three year period, an estimated 74,000 Cubans emi-
grated to the U.S.85  The total number of Cuban refugees nearly doubled as 
a result of Castro’s September announcements when he permitted the re-
lease of Cubans with no penalty or consequence,86 and “opened the fishing 
port of Camarioca to all exiles [in the U.S.] wanting to take their relatives 
from the island.”87  The sea and weather caused a dangerous combination, 
and both governments found it necessary to negotiate an accord.88  The U.S. 
agreed to transport nearly 4,000 Cubans per month by air as a continuation 
of its open arms policy, while Cuba regulated its ports.89  The “Freedom 
Flights” provided a means to reach the safe haven of the U.S. for more than 
260,000 Cubans over a span of eight years.90
The third period was October 1965 – August 1966.  After President 
Lyndon B. Johnson announced the new policies that governed the arrival of 
Cuban refugees, an influx began and nearly 93,000 Cubans settled in the 
Miami, Florida, area.91  In general, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare found that the Cubans were “cooperative and worthy, in every 
respect of our assistance.”92  Reasons given for these sentiments included 
79 See id.
80
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the following: excellent adjustment into American communities, good work 
record, employers sought them out for employment, and few needed public 
assistance.93
C. Refugees and the law 
International refugee law began to take shape in 1921 with the is-
suance of what was known as a “Nansen passport.”94  Fridtjof Nansen was 
the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees of the League of Nations in 
1921.95  “The task of the High Commissioner in the legal field was the legal 
and political protection of refugees.”96   
In 1950, the United Nations established the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Statute of 
UNHCR to develop the functions of predecessor organizations, as well as to 
promote international conventions protecting refugees, supervise their ap-
plication, propose amendments, and promote admission of refugees.97  In 
1951, the United Nations adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.98  The Convention is regarded as “the most important internation-
al instrument relating to refugees.”99  It defines refugees broadly in order to 
ensure a universal approach to the Convention and the protection of refu-
gees.100  The term refugee according to the Convention applies to a person 
who: 
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.101
The protections of the Act apply to refugees regardless of their country of 
origin.102
93 See id.
94
 Paul Weis, The Development of Refugee Law, 3 MICH. YBI LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (1982) [herei-
nafter Refugee Law]. 
95
 Id.
96
 Id. (internal quotations ommitted).  
97
 See Legomsky, supra note 20, at 925. 
98
 Refugee Law, supra note 94, at 28.  
99
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101
 See id. at 31 (citing Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
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102
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Most importantly, Article 33 of the Convention, through the principle 
of non-refoulement, restricts expulsion or deportation of refugees.  “No 
refugee shall . . . be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”103  The principle of non-refoulement is the cor-
nerstone of refugee law, and has risen to the level of general principle of 
law, customary international law, and jus cogens.104  More specifically, as 
jus cogens, the principle of non-refoulement and Article 33 of the Conven-
tion are a “mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted.  A peremptory norm can be modified only 
by a later norm that has the same character.”105
On January 31, 1967, the U.S. ratified the Protocol relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, a broader version of the Convention that removes the Jan-
uary 1, 1951 date from the refugee definition.106  Contracting states of the 
Protocol apply the substantive provisions and refugee definition in the Con-
vention with the omission of the January 1, 1951.107  However, nothing in 
the Convention or Protocol “requires any nation to admit overseas refugees 
in the first place.”108  The Convention and Protocol allow for the exclusion 
of certain persons from protection: persons resettled elsewhere and certain 
criminals.109  What has ensued are certain exclusions that “nullify the pro-
tection against refoulement . . . [and] render the entire Convention inopera-
tive.”110
When President Clinton ordered the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept 
Haitians attempting to reach the U.S. by sea and to return them to Haiti 
without determining their qualification as refugees, the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc., held that Article 
33 had not been violated because it did not apply to the situation.111  Ac-
cording to the Court, “the text and negotiating history of Article 33 . . . are 
both completely silent with respect to the Article’s possible application to 
actions taken by a country outside its own borders . . . .  [B]oth the text and 
the negotiating history . . . affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to 
have extraterritorial effect.”112  The respondents argued that the words “any 
103
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104 Id.
105
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106
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112
 Id. at 178-79. 
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alien” and “return” are not limited to aliens within the U.S.,113 but the Court 
found that “return” had a narrower legal meaning compared to its common 
meaning.114   
The majority expressly acknowledged that the drafters of the Conven-
tion and Protocol may not have contemplated a contracting state “gath-
er[ing] fleeing refugees and return[ing] them to the one country they had 
desperately sought to escape.”115  The majority expressly stated that such 
action may “violate the spirit of Article 33,”116 but it was not persuaded.117
Justice Blackmun, however, was compelled to dissent.118  He believed any 
expelling or return (refoulement) is a violation of Article 33.119  “The terms 
are unambiguous.  Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned.  The language 
is clear, and the command is straightforward; that should be the end of the 
inquiry.  Indeed, until litigation ensued, the Government consistently ac-
knowledged that the Convention applied on the high seas.”120
The UNHCR supervises the implementation of the Convention and 
cooperation of the contracting states.121  Unfortunately, neither the Conven-
tion nor other sources of international law give the UNHCR the power to 
compel or issue binding interpretations.122  In the U.S., no statute authorizes 
the admission of refugees.123  Instead, Congress has occasionally passed ad 
hoc legislation to deal with specific crises, i.e., Cubans who left Cuba after 
Fidel Castro assumed power, rather than addressing possible violations of 
international law.124
The Convention and the Protocol are the most important instruments 
regarding refugees, but they are not the only treaties that afford refugees 
broad rights and protections.125  The Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen 
was adopted on November 11, 1957, and extends protection to seamen who 
are “in the absence of documents, frequently unable to go on land.”126  It 
requires contracting states to issue travel documents to refugee seamen who 
are linked to the contracting states either through previous residence, pre-
vious travel documents, or service on a ship carrying a contracting state’s 
113
 Id. at 170. 
114
 Id. at 180. 
115
 Id. at 183. 
116
 Id.
117
 Sale, 509 U.S. at 183. 
118
 Id. at 188-208. 
119
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flag.127  The U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
September 28, 1954, protects refugees who are not considered to be nation-
als of any state, thus extending protection to stateless persons who are not 
covered by the 1951 Convention.128  The U.N. Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness, August 28, 1961, helps stateless refugees acquire nationali-
ty.129  The U.N. Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance and 
Protocol No. 1 to the Universal Copyright Convention also extend benefits 
specifically designed for refugees.130
In 1980, Congress was led to pass the first comprehensive refugee leg-
islation in U.S. history.131  The Refugee Act of 1980 is the principal U.S. 
statutory law governing overseas refugees.132  It provides the first domestic 
definition of refugee,133 requiring “persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.”134  In what appeared to be a step 
in the right direction for refugees wishing to reach the U.S., the 1980 Act 
deleted all ideological and geographical limitations from the refugee defini-
tion.135  However, the courts have narrowed the definition in various ways, 
136
 and refugees, such as Haitians, continue to be refouled to their home 
country. 
D. Criticisms from 1966 
The CAA did not pass without some criticism.137  Some House Repre-
sentatives were concerned with allowing too many Cubans to enter the 
United States in a short period of time.138  According to these conservative 
127
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128
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 See id.
130
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3 (facilitating the establishment and execution of claims of maintenance); Protocol No. 1 of the Univer-
sal Copyright Convention, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (assimilat-
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copyright laws). 
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Representatives, they were trying as best they could to “protect the rights – 
that is, the job rights—of our own people, and particularly our southern 
colored people.”139  The more liberal countered by pointing to the fact that 
the country’s unemployment rate was at its lowest ever, but Rep. Arch Al-
fred, Jr. from West Virginia responded to the liberals:140
Sure we have a low rate of unemployment, but I remind my col-
leagues that we have 500,000 men . . . in South Vietnam, and we are 
experiencing the largest draft call we have ever had in any period of 
time . . . .  So as we consider this legislation let’s keep [the war and 
the unemployment rate] in mind.141
Rep. Arch Alfred, Jr. warned the Committee of the return of American sol-
diers from Vietnam, and their need for jobs.   
Today’s most forthcoming concern was foreshadowed by Rep. Moore.  
He wondered whether another group would factually fit the mold of Cubans 
and what would happen to them?142  He asked the Attorney General, 
“[w]ould you feel free to make parole available on any set of fact which 
you might want to characterize as being refugee in character?”143  Essential-
ly, Rep. Moore was asking whether persons similarly situated to Cuban 
refugees would receive the same special treatment.  The Attorney General 
responded:  
It seems to me it would be foolish for me to flatly predict there could 
not be another situation.  I don’t foresee one.  I don’t know of any.  I 
would hope to goodness there is not going to be another Castro kind 
of situation within this hemisphere.  I don’t foresee one.  I don’t think 
it will occur, but would say this: If you have the same kinds of facts 
that we have had with respect to Cuba, then I would suppose that we 
would do the same thing and feel that this was exercising the power in 
the public interest, but I don’t foresee that.144
The Attorney General’s predictions were not accurate.145
The conservative Representatives had a problem with the “administra-
tive liberalization of parole,” i.e., the extension of the law with regards to 
139
 Id. (statement of Rep. Chelf). 
140
 See id. at 32-33. 
141
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refugees in a manner that favored a group at the discretion of the Attorney 
General.146  The Attorney General was continuously questioned on the mat-
ter, but in the end, Rep. Moore disclosed that the reasoning behind the ques-
tioning was only to “determine how far this might be . . . stretched to ac-
complish anyone of a number of ends . . . .  I just made the observation so 
that he might know that there are some of us in the Congress just wondering 
how far this . . . could possibly go. . . . ”147  Apparently, from the tone of the 
Representatives and the line of questioning, Congress appeared to be will-
ing to grant this one time exemption to Cubans, but it was hoping to not 
deal with this or any other refugee group claim in the future.  Nevertheless, 
three months after the Hearings, H.R. 15183, the Cuban Refugee Adjust-
ment Act of 1966, was enacted into law.148
E. The Underpinnings of the Hearings
One fact mentioned at length throughout all three days of Congres-
sional Hearings focused on the Cubans’ length of stay.  The bill passed un-
der the expectation that the majority of refugees would return to Cuba once 
freedom reigned on the island.149  The Subcommittee also did not expect the 
Castro regime to survive.150  Not only did the Subcommittee expect that 
Communism would fail in Cuba, they also expected the paroled refugees to 
return to Cuba.151  The Hon. Ball, in a statement to the Subcommittee, men-
tioned that once Cuba was free again, “the status of the Cubans as residents 
and parolees would in no way affect their freedom to return to their native 
land.”152  Later during the Hearings, the Hon. Ball further mentioned that 
the U.S., through passage of the bill, only “extend[ed] the option [of ad-
justment] to those who want it . . . .  [E]ven though at some time in the fu-
ture, when Cuba does become free—because I am certain it will—some of 
them may wish to go back and resume their life there.”153
A dialogue between Rep. Robert Thomas Cahill from New Jersey and 
the Hon. Ball ensued on this issue. 
Rep. Cahill:  Don’t you think the efforts that will pave the way for 
eventual American citizenship will be a deterrent rather than an incen-
tive for them to return to Cuba?  
146
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147
 Id.
148
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Hon. Ball:  I wouldn’t think so because the reasons that would lead 
them to return to Cuba is that love of country which I think you will 
find is very deep among most Cubans.  They want to go back to Cuba.  
They want to rebuild their country and they will do so when the op-
portunity –  
Rep. Cahill:  Then why should we grant these people American citi-
zenship? 
. . . . 
Rep. Cahill: . . . [I]sn’t there some other way of doing this besides 
granting of citizenship? 
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
Rep. Cahill:  This legislation would be open-ended, would it not; there 
would be no termination, and there could be unlimited number. 
. . . .  
Rep. Cahill:  Therefore, it seems to me that the Cuban refugees . . . 
will love the way we live and won’t want to go back to their native 
land.  We are really closing our eyes to reality if we expect that these 
people will return to the conditions from which they have come . . . .  
A great deal of thought . . . should be given to [the bill] because we 
are indeed, in my judgment, setting a precedent which will have far-
reaching effects in the future.154
The Representative from New Jersey was correct, but his concern with set-
ting precedent was never realized because Congress has refused to extend 
the same preferential treatment to other similarly situated refugees.155  Per-
154
 Id. at 18-19.  
155
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526 FIU Law Review [3:509
haps Rep. Cahill’s true concern was not with setting a precedent, but having 
to regularly replicate a pro-refugee decision in the future. 
F. An Image Change 
The Congressional Hearings provided a romantic image of the Cuban 
immigrant—the model minority.156  They had been characterized as hard 
working professionals who were an asset to American communities.157
However, this image changed in 1980.  In April of 1980, a group of Cubans 
seeking political asylum crashed a bus through the gates of the Peruvian 
embassy in Cuba.158  The Peruvian government refused to hand over the 
Cubans at the request of the Cuban government.159  In response, Fidel Ca-
stro announced that any Cuban who wished to leave Cuba should assemble 
at the Peruvian embassy.160  An estimated 10,000 men, women and children 
squeezed into the embassy faster than negotiations with third party states 
initiated.161  Meanwhile, Cuban exiles in the U.S. began to prepare a mas-
sive boatlift.162  Fidel Castro once again opened a port in Cuba, and caused 
an exodus of Cuban immigration in the U.S.163
The 1980 “Freedom Flotilla” consisted of Cuban exiles in the U.S. 
venturing by boat to the port of Mariel, Cuba, to pick up their relatives.164
“In May 1980, the boatlift was at its height.  More than 16,000 refugees 
arrived in one six-day period alone.  “By the time the 159-day exodus 
ended on Sept. 26, 1980, nearly 125,000 Cuban refugees escaped to the 
United States.”165  Boats of ex-immigrants returned to Cuba to help Cubans 
escape,166 but this time the U.S. was not receiving boat loads of profession-
als.  Castro sent the U.S. what he described as the scum of his country, i.e., 
antisocialist, homosexuals, drug addicts, and gambling addicts.167  Almost 
States since December 31, 1995 and applied for asylum or had been paroled before that date. HRIFA, 
Pub. L. 105-277, Title IX, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).  
NACARA and HRIFA are steps in the right direction, but they apply to aliens present in the United 
States before 1995.  The CAA applies to Cubans who arrived in the United States for a period before 
1959, and all those after.  Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255) (1966).   
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half of the new arrivals had criminal backgrounds that ranged from theft, 
possession of drugs, fraud, and crimes against the normal development of 
sexual relations.168  The influx caused then President Jimmy Carter to take 
steps contrary to the spirit of the CAA, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
speech, and the thoughts expressed during the 1966 Congressional Hear-
ings.  The boats carrying refugees were ordered to be stopped and seized.169
The arrival of these Cubans coincided with a departure from the politi-
cal outlook toward Cuban immigrants.  “Until 1980, Cuban exile politics 
had focused on the idea of returning to the island,” however, the new ex-
odus in addition to a lack of imminent diplomatic change in Cuba, led to the 
realization that the Cuban exiles intended to stay in the U.S.170  Neverthe-
less, the 1980 group of Cubans received the same treatment as the group 
that immigrated in the late 1960s.171  The Carter administration’s Open 
Hearts and Open Arms Policy relied on the CAA as it allowed the Cuban 
immigrants to find refuge from political persecution in Cuba and seek asy-
lum in the U.S.172
More change in the treatment of Cubans resulted as Castro attempted 
to repeat the events of 1980.  In 1994, Castro once again pried open the exit 
doors of Cuba to those wishing to take flight; however, this group was dis-
similar to both previous groups.173  Unlike the first two groups, the majority 
this time set sail on rafts made of inner tubes, boxes, planks of wood, and 
any floating material that could be tied together.174  Not only did they arrive 
in a different manner in comparison to the predecessor groups, but they also 
received different immigration treatment from the U.S. government.175
In August of 1994, President Bill Clinton and Cuba opened diplomatic 
discussion with the goal of “defusing the refugee crises.”176  The Clinton 
Administration took the position that Cubans were risking their lives at sea 
on rafts, and thus the Cuban government should stop the exit flow.177  The 
168
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U.S. now sent a new message to Cubans who wished to reach the U.S.  
“The boat people would not be admitted.”178  Roughly 12,000 Cubans were 
intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard, and on August 19, 1994, Presi-
dent Clinton “reversed longstanding policy and ordered that the boat people 
be barred from the United States and instead be taken to Guantánamo Bay 
[U.S. Naval Base, Cuba].”179  However, the agreement to completely stop 
the flow of immigration to the U.S. was not successful.180
G. Fidel Castro’s View 
According to Castro, “this is the killer Cuban Adjustment Act.”181  “It 
is a perverse policy, deliberately conceived to destabilize and suffocate Cu-
ban society, cynically calculated to provoke death and suffering, shameless-
ly manipulating the tragedies that this law causes.”182  Cubans are encour-
aged to immigrate illegally and place their lives in danger.183  Further, the 
Act is to blame for the international custody battle of Elian Gonzalez.184
The CAA is a form of political ammunition for his enemies “who describe 
the migrants as desperate boat people fleeing their communist homeland for 
freedom.”185  For support, Cuban leaders point to Haitians and Domini-
cans.
186
  These groups seek the same opportunities in America as Cubans, 
but they are not allowed to stay.187  “In a colossal operation of falsification . 
. . and promotion of lies, [the U.S.] has tried to present Cubans as people 
who want to ‘escape’ to North America, and that the United States as a ‘ge-
nerous’ nation receives them. [That argument] doesn’t contain an atom of 
truth.”188
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III. ANALYSIS – THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT TODAY
A. The Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy 
Cuban immigrants who seek to invoke their special privileges under 
the CAA must now rely on an immigration legislation anomaly.  The signi-
ficance of the 1994 agreement between the Cuban government and Clinton 
Administration is that when coupled with the CAA, those Cuban immi-
grants who are captured at sea are returned to Cuba, but those who reach 
American soil may invoke their rights under the CAA.189  The anomaly has 
come to be known as the Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy.190
The struggle to reach the U.S. now extends beyond the rigorous and 
life-threatening voyage through the 90 mile straight between the U.S. and 
Cuba.191  Today, the highest drama takes place on the beaches of South Flor-
ida.192  “Cubans try almost anything, including threatened self-immolation 
and suicide, to hold off the Coast Guard long enough to put at least a foot 
on dry sand.”193  Cuban mothers have gone as far as threatening to drown 
their own children if Coast Guard members come too close.194  Altercations 
are numerous, and guaranteed to continue in the future.195  Therefore, “the 
politics of applying migration law have to be revised to become more hu-
189
 See No Foot, supra note 16, at 445. 
190 See id.
191
 See Rick Bragg, Cubans Now Choosing Smugglers Over Rafts, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1999, at 1. 
192
 See id.
193
 Id.
194 See id.
195
 See id.; Cuban Immigrants Land in So. Florida, UPI NEWSTRACK, Jan. 21, 2007 (27 Cuban 
immigrants land on an island near Key Biscayne, Florida; however, earlier in January 2007, 91 refugees 
were captured at sea and returned to Cuba); Cuban Landing Shows Security Flaw, WORLD, Jan. 2, 2007 
(25 Cubans were found huddled on the beach of Beer Can Island off the west coast of Florida); Immi-
gration Issues: Cubans Make It to the United States, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29 , 2006, at A22 (15 
Cubans reached an abandoned portion of the Old Seven Mile Bridge in the Florida Keys.  They were 
wrongfully repatriated as U.S. immigration officials claims the bridge did not constitute dry land under 
the Wet Foot, Dry Foot Policy.  Months later, 6 of the wrongfully repatriated Cubans did the impossible 
— “they made another perilous escape to the United States, this time being admitted.”); Joel Maroney, 
Cuban Boats No Surprise—Marco Landing of 20 Refugees Comes With Local Officials Watching Layout 
Space, NEWS-PRESS, Aug. 16, 2006, at A1 (20 Cubans land on the shores of Marco Island, Florida.  The 
small island off the west coast of Florida is accustomed to these arrivals, but authorities mention that 
they are not the first in line for Cuban refugees.  The Florida Keys are only 90 miles from Cuba, and are 
the more logical choice of destination.  The seas are difficult to navigate, so refugees often mist their 
intended marks); Madeline Baro Diaz, Family In Floating Cab Ask to be Let Into U.S., S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Jun. 9, 2005, at B1 (a Cuban family tried to float to Florida on a vintage vehicle-turned boat.  
The family had applied for exit visa, but one was denied because she was a doctor and another because 
he was old enough for military service); Copter Flies 34 Cubans to Freedom Asylum-Seekers Land Near 
Miami After Commandeering Craft in Daring Escape Plot, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 4, 1992, at 2 
(34 Cubans commandeered a tourist helicopter and flew from a resort in Varadero, Cuba, at low heights 
to avoid Cuban radars, to the U.S.  At least on one other occasion, a Cuban major flew a Mig fighter jet 
to the U.S.  Cubans have also flown small crop-duster planes to the U.S.). 
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mane.”
196
 Change in Cuba does not appear to be imminent, and Cubans will 
continue to risk their lives in hopes of setting foot on American soil and 
invoking the CAA.197
B. Comparing the Concerns Voiced During the 1966 Congressional Hear-
ings and the Current State of Cuban Affairs and Immigration Policy 
The current diplomatic situation between the U.S. and Cuba is inade-
quate.198  In the past, when confronted with various exoduses of Cuban im-
migrants, Congress held Congressional Hearings or discussions with the 
government of Cuba.199  Today, Cuba and the U.S. continue to be at a dip-
lomatic stalemate.200  In light of the diplomatic silence and the current ano-
maly posed by the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy, I offer a foreshadowing of 
196
 Bragg, supra note 191 (statement of Ramon Saul Sanchez, delegate with Movimiento Demo-
cracia, a Miami based anti-Castro group).  
197
 Growing up Cuban in Miami, Florida, you develop a thick skin against news from the island 
because rumors about change in Cuba are constantly presented and proven to be untrue.  See Vanessa 
Arrington, From Appendicitis to Poisoned Cigars, Fidel Castro Has Repeatedly Defied Death,
ASSOCIATED PRESS ARCHIVE, Aug. 6, 2006.  In 1961, the C.I.A. trained Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion and Castro’s assassination.  Id.  Nearly 150 Cubans were killed, but Castro was unharmed.  Id.    
There have been more than 30 plots to assassinate Castro.  Id.  All of which were unsuccessful.  Id.
With each attempt or illness, hope of a better future rises.  Id.  With each failed attempt or recovery, 
hope slips away.  Id.  “Cubans have no idea whether dictator Fidel Castro is lying at death’s door or 
sitting up and watching reruns of ‘Jeopardy.’”  Stephanie Mansfield, Cubans in Dark on Fate of Fidel – 
Parallel Noted in Soviet Deaths, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at A01.  Cubans in Cuba and the U.S. 
were left wondering what had happened to Castro.  Id.  In Miami, they awaited news of Castro’s death 
with champagne, beeping car horns, and Cuban flags.  Id.  Expectations once again proved to be untrue.  
Id.  For example, rumors about Castro’s death caused uproars of celebration in the Cuban enclaves of 
South Florida, but once again, like so many times before, possible change in Cuba turned out to be a 
hoax. See After Fidel Miami Smartly Reconsiders Post-Castro Event, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 
2007, at A18. 
198
 See Pablo Bachelet & Frances Robles, Cuba Cuts Power to U.S. Mission, MIAMI HERALD, Jun. 
13, 2006, at A1.  “Electricity to the U.S. Interests section—not quite an embassy because Cuba and the 
United States do not have formal diplomatic relations—was cut off at 3 a.m. on June 5, [2006].”   Id.
The electricity incident was another event in what has been a “dramatic escalation of a campaign of 
harassment of American diplomats that allegedly includes poisoning a family pet and shutting off wa-
ter.”  Id.  Other examples of harassment on the part of Cuba officials include the following: not award-
ing visas to newly appointed U.S. diplomats; denying requests for transportation, computers, and other 
supplies; preventing the hiring of Cuban maintenance workers; restricting gasoline access; and denying 
exit permits to Cuban employees who need training abroad.  Id.
199
 See Hearings, supra note 28. 
200
 Bob Deans, U.S. Relations With Cuba Ripe For Thaw With a Democratic Majority, Those Who 
Favor Closer Ties See Opportunity to Reverse Strict Bush Policy, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
Feb. 4, 2007, at A18.  The former Republican controlled House and Senate have been hesitant to chal-
lenge restrictions on Cuba.  Id.  “Conservative Cuban-Americans in South Florida have long been active 
in pressuring Washington and flexing their political muscle within the GOP to maintain sanction on 
Cuba.”  Id.  However, with the new Democratic control of the House and Senate, some sanctions may be 
challenged.  Id.  Some argue that common sense leans toward the creation of a strong relationship with 
Cuba.  Id.  “Whether we like or dislike, or agree or disagree, with the government there,” said Rep. Ray 
LaHood (R-Ill).  Id.  Others counter by calling any potential lift of sanctions against Cuba as a victory 
for Castro.  Id.  To many, the sanctions “remain[] a powerful symbol of U.S. opposition to Castro.”  Id.
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what Congressional Hearings on the state of Cuban affairs and immigration 
policy would appear like in 2008.  Comparing the remarks and concerns of 
the representatives present at the 1966 Hearings prove useful to understand-
ing the growing concern over the current preferential treatment of Cubans.  
The following is a selection of the issues raised in 1966 followed by mod-
ern hypothetical responses. 
According to the 1966 Hearings, the CAA was passed to improve the 
plight of the thousands of Cubans who left Cuba because of the oppression 
faced at the hands of a communist Cuban government.201  The U.S. desired 
to play a “full and sympathetic role” as a home for refugees from a com-
munist government.202
Today, there have been no significant changes in the approach the Cu-
ban government takes in controlling life in Cuba.203  The totalitarian regime 
controls all aspects of life in Cuba through pressure from the Communist 
Party.204  “The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies 
citizens the right to change their government.”205  Cuban nationals are in-
carcerated for manifesting their political beliefs, and though the Cuban con-
stitution provides for freedom of speech, all speech must conform to social-
ist thought.206  “The government does not tolerate dissent.”207  In 2006, ha-
rassment and intimidation of critics and dissidents increased.208  At least 67 
“prisoners of conscience” —teachers, journalists, human rights defenders—
are imprisoned throughout Cuba after unfair trials that do not meet interna-
tional standards.209  All print and media are under control of the state.  Inter-
net access is severely limited.210
Nor does governmental change appear to be imminent.211  According to 
a poll conducted in 2004 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research and 
Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, 16% of Cu-
ban-Americans polled felt that political change will never occur in Cuba.212
In light of the above-mentioned facts, the situation in Cuba does not war-
201
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of the Hon. George Ball). 
202
 Id. at 4.  
203
 See id.
204 See id.
205
 Id.
206
 See id.; Amnesty International Raps Cuba on Human Rights, EFE NEWS SERVICES, Jan. 29, 
2007 [hereinafter Amnesty International] (according to Amnesty International, the government of Cuba 
continues to commit assorted abuses of human rights, such as the imprisonment of political dissidents 
and severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly). 
207
 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Events, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/. 
208
 See Amnesty International, supra note 206. 
209
 Id.
210
 Id. 
211
 Id. (as of late January 2007, reports indicate that Cuba continues to fail international standards 
of human rights). 
212
 See Florida International University Cuba Poll, 
http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cubapoll/index.html. [hereinafter The Cuba Poll]. 
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rant abolishment of the CAA; rather, because Cubans in Cuba continue to 
face oppression by the Cuban government, the adjustment of status Con-
gress has granted Cubans via the CAA is justified and upheld.213
According to the 1966 Hearings, the only means to obtain a visa was if 
a Cuban who had arrived in the U.S. left the country and applied at an 
American consulate abroad.214  Since diplomatic ties with Cuba were se-
vered on January 3, 1961, Cubans cannot apply for an immigration visa 
from within Cuba for the sole purpose of acquiring permanent residency in 
the U.S.215
Today, immigration processing from within Cuba is possible, to a li-
mited extent.216  “Immigration processing in Cuba is regulated by the Sep-
tember 4, 1994, Joint Communique between the U.S. government and the 
government of Cuba.”217  Currently, 20,000 visas are awarded to Cubans 
who fall within the following three groups: (1) family based; (2) refugee 
protection; and (3) discretionary parole under the Special Cuban Migration 
Program referred to as the Cuban Lottery.218  However, an additional proce-
dure employed by the Cuban government complicates an already imperfect 
system.  Cubans must obtain an exit visa before departing from Cuba.219
Over 500 applicants who were awarded an exit visa have not been allowed 
to exit Cuba.220  Further, Cuba has refused to initiate a new registration for 
the supposedly annual U.S. visa lottery.221  The last registration was held in 
1998.222
Efforts to correct the backlog have failed, and since 2003, when a 
meeting with the Cuban government was canceled because of its unwilling-
ness to collaborate with the U.S., there have been little communications 
213
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (the political oppression that led the Representatives present 
at the 1966 Congressional Hearings presently remain in Cuba). 
214
 Id; Cuban Refugees Seek New Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 15. 
215
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 8. 
216
 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis.  
217
 Id.
218 See id.
219
 See Oscar Corral, U.S. Says Cuba Not Trying To Halt Migrants, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 
2005, at 1A [hereinafter U.S. Says Cuba]; Andres Viglucci, Costly Exit Fees Keep Some Cubans From 
Using Visas, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 1998, at 1A.  By 1998, 5,700 of the 42,000 Cubans granted a U.S. 
immigration visa had not reached the U.S due to high exit fees.  Id.  The fees, $500 for adult and $400 
for children to be paid in U.S. currency only, are coupled with air travel to the U.S. and mandatory 
medical exams.  Id.  “In some cases, the visas, which are good for six months and renewable for six 
months, expire and recipients must reapply.”  Id.  Some must give up their dream of reaching the U.S. 
for lack of money.  Id.  “There are other impediments as well.  In a relatively small number of cases, 
mainly involving young men of military service age and relatives of high level defectors, the Cuban 
government refuses exit visas.”  Id.
220
 See U.S. Says Cuba, supra note 219, at 1A. 
221 See id.
222 See id.
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between the two sides with regards to immigration issues.223  In light of 
Cuba’s non-cooperation, specifically with the U.S. visa lottery, there is no 
reasonable method by which a Cuban in Cuba may apply for a visa to enter 
the U.S. or a Cuban visa to exit Cuba.224  The CAA should remain intact as 
Cubans are continually forced to risk their lives at sea in order to reach the 
U.S.225
According to the 1966 Hearings, an adverse result of preventing Cu-
bans from receiving permanent residence in the U.S. is that “skilled and 
professionally trained individuals who would be a credit to this country are 
prevented from obtaining gainful employment [in the U.S.], either because 
of conditions imposed independently by employers, or because of restric-
tive statutes.  Enactment of [the CAA] . . . removes many bars to the self-
sufficiency of Cuban refugees.”226
Today, many Cuban professionals who would be a credit to American 
society are being prevented from gaining access to the United States.  For 
example, 171 of the estimated 500 Cubans who have been awarded a U.S. 
visa, but have not been allowed to exit Cuba, are doctors.227  Cuban doctors, 
who wish to leave Cuba for the same reasons non-professionals immigrate, 
customarily defected while in a third country; however, this has been diffi-
cult to accomplish.228  Professionals who perform their trained skills in third 
countries are often considered to live in that country, and thus are no longer 
escaping the oppression at the hands of the Cuban government.229  An esti-
mated 500 medical personnel have recently defected.230  The above men-
tioned facts taken into consideration, Cuban professionals who would be an 
asset to American society are being prevented from gaining access to the 
U.S.231  In an effort to facilitate the admission of these individuals, U.S. 
policy “announced in August [2006], enables Cuban medical personnel 
working abroad to come to the United States once they passed routine 
background checks.”232  In light of this policy and the benefits of permitting 
223 See id.
224
 See supra notes 165-172 and accompanying text. 
225
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 3.  Cubans in 1966 could not apply for a U.S. visa from within 
Cuba.  Id.  Cubans in 2006 are not being granted the U.S. visas they are entitled to under the Joint 
Communique.  Id.
226
 Id. at 9 (statement of the Hon. Emanuel Celler). 
227
 See U.S. Says Cuba, supra note 219, at 1A. 
228
 See Alfonso Chardy, U.S. Tweaks Cuba Policy, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 12, 2006, at 1B [herei-
nafter U.S. Tweaks]. 
229 See id.
230 See id.
231
 See Asylum Bid Stalls For 38 Cuban Doctors, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2007, at 9.  Thirty-eight 
Cuban doctors have defected from a mission in Venezuela, and await refugee status in Venezuela.  Id.
They hope to seek asylum in the U.S., but have been waiting a Venezuelan response for 6 months.  Id.
232
 Id.; Vanessa Bauza, Cuban Troupe Defects in Vegas: 44 Performers of Music Group Seek 
Asylum in the U.S., S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 2004, at 1A.  Forty-four performers of the Havana 
Night Club show took place in large mass defection from Cuba.  Id.  They feared group disbandment 
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these individuals to remain in the U.S., the CAA should continue to ensure 
at least one avenue that provides professionals such as doctors, nurses, and 
other needed medical personnel to stay in the U.S.233
According to the 1966 Hearings, the efforts taken by the U.S. to wel-
come the Cuban immigrants are “humanitarian gestures,” and in no way 
indicate a change in political posture toward Cuba.234  In other words, the 
CAA in no way is indicative of a direct agreement with the Cuban govern-
ment; rather, it is a form of relief to the Cuban people.235  The essence of the 
American posture toward Cuba is that Cuba one day will return again to the 
“free world family of nations,” while the gates to the U.S. remain open to 
those who wish to flee the oppression of the totalitarian government.236   
Today, the American stance on Cuba has not changed since the incep-
tion of the CAA in 1966.237  Cuba and the U.S. continue to have no diplo-
matic relations,238 and the U.S. embargo continues to restrict trade with Cu-
ban industries.239  Earlier this year, concern over Cuba grew once again as 
the nation wondered—or at least South Florida and other Cuban enclaves—
whether the death of Fidel Castro and the transfer of power to his brother, 
Raul Castro, would cause diplomatic change on the island.240 According to 
Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “[i]t 
is our view that Cuba's future has to be determined by the Cuban people. 
That ultimately no political solution can be imposed from the outside, nei-
ther from the United States, nor any other country . . . .  [I]t’s imperative 
that the Cuban people be able to choose their future.”241
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also spoke to the Cuban people as 
the death of Fidel Castro appeared imminent.   
Much is changing [in Cuba], yet one thing remains constant: Ameri-
ca’s commitment to supporting a future of freedom for Cuba, a future 
that will be defined by you—the Cuban people.  
after a trip to perform in the U.S.; they filed for political asylum in Las Vegas.  Id.  “They felt they were 
given no choice on the way out the door [of Cuba].”  Id.
233
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 9 (Congressional interest in granted adjustment of status via the 
CAA to Cuban professionals). 
234
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 17. 
235 See id.
236
 Id.
237
 See Pierre M. Atlas, U.S. Must Change Policies That Harm Haitians, Cubans, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at A12 [hereinafter U.S. Must Change].  During the Cold War, Cuba and the Soviet 
Union marched side-by-side.  Id.  “Thanks to the 40-year old trade embargo and especially the demise 
of the Soviet economic subsidies, Cuba is no longer a threat.”  Id.  However, though the rationales for 
the embargo are no longer convincing, trade with Cuba remains restricted.  Id. 
238
 See Bachelet & Robles, supra note 198, at 1A. 
239
 See U.S. Must Change, supra note 237, at A12.
240
 See Thomas Shannon, Assistant Sec’y of State for W. Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward 
Cuba (Aug. 23, 2006), transcript available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/71065.htm. 
241
 Id. (alteration in original). 
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. . . [W]e will stand with you to secure your rights. 
. . . [A]nd we stand ready to provide you with humanitarian assistance, 
as you begin to chart a new course for your country. 
. . . .  
It has long been the hope of the United States that a free, independent, 
and democratic Cuba would be more than just a close neighbor—it 
would be a close friend. This is our goal, now more than ever, and 
throughout this time of change, all of you must know that you have no 
greater friend than the United States of America.242
As evidenced by the statements of Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in conjunction with the continuation of 
restrictive and limiting U.S. policies toward Cuba such as the embargo, the 
furthering of humanitarian aid to Cuban immigrants via the CAA in no way 
changes the U.S. government’s stance against the totalitarian regime.243
According to the 1966 Hearings, Cubans do not intend to reside per-
manently in the United States.244  Once conditions improve in Cuba, the 
immigrants will return to their homes abroad.245
Today, a poll conducted in 2004 by the Institute for Public Opinion 
Research and Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University 
indicates that 46.2% of Cubans polled are not at all likely to return to Cuba 
if the Cuban government shifts from a totalitarian to a democratic form.246
It should come as no surprise that the population of Cubans in the U.S. has 
increased since the establishment of the CAA.  In 1980, nearly 570,000 
Cubans called Miami, Florida, their home.247  The U.S. Census Bureau’s 
2000 census indicates that over 833,000 Cubans live in Florida.248  “Mem-
bers of the first generation that fled Cuba after Fidel Castro came to power 
were always sustained by the dream of one day seeing their homeland free 
of its Communist government.249  But in time . . . [t]hey remade themselves 
242
 Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State Condoleeza Rice Message to the People of Cuba (Aug. 4, 
2006) (alteration in original), transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69974.htm.  
243
 See generally, Hearings, supra note 28, at 17-18 (accepting Cuban immigrants in 1966 as a 
humanitarian gesture does not change the overall outlook of the U.S government toward Cuba). 
244
 See id. at 18; Cuban Refugees Seek Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 15 (the thousands of 
Cubans that filled immigration offices in 1966, just after enactment of the CAA, did not all intend to 
stay in the U.S. permanently.  “They were more interested in the immediate benefits of becoming per-
manent residents than in seeking citizenship after five years of residency.”  Some did not intend to give 
up their Cuban citizenship, hoping to return home someday). 
245
 See id.
246
 See The Cuba Poll, supra note 212.  
247
 See Transformation, supra note 87, at 20. 
248
 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Selected Population 
Group: Cuban.   
249
 See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the hope many Cubans retain of one day 
returning to Cuba). 
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and [the cities they live in].”250  Over time, the Cuban immigrants have set-
tled in the U.S. and have realized that they and their children cannot pack 
up and leave the U.S. for a country they either left decades ago or have 
never known.251  The reality for many Cuban immigrants “is that home is 
here now.”252  It has become evident that Cubans who arrive in the U.S. and 
adjust their immigration status through the CAA are not contemplating a 
temporary stay in the U.S.253
According to the 1966 Hearings, Cuban immigrants prefer to settle in 
the U.S., “particularly the Miami area and Florida.”254  Americans and Cu-
bans know one another through tourist excursions and business expe-
riences.255  Cubans have visited the Miami area and other parts of the U.S. 
on holidays, and “know this part of the world.”256  “[Cubans] know how to 
live with Americans.”257  Additionally, Central and South Americans have 
less in common with Cubans than do Americans.258  The Spanish that is 
spoken in some Latin American countries is different from that spoken in 
Cuba, and we must not underestimate the diversity between Latin America 
and Cuba.259
Today, Argentina shares a close relationship with the people of Cuba 
because of the honored and beloved icon Ernesto “Che” Guevara.260  Boli-
via is another ally of Cuba in South America.261  Arguably, Cuba has no 
250
 David Gonzalez and Abby Goodnough, Cubans in U.S. Feel the Tug of Two Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A1 (hereinafter Tug of Two Homes). 
251
 See Bill Steigerwald, What’s Next For Cuba After Castro?, THE JERSEY JOURNAL, Aug. 14, 
2006, at A17 (“You’re not talking about exiles who arrived a year ago.  You’re talking about thousands 
of people who came in more than 40 years ago.  They married here.  They have children.  Their children 
married here.  There are folks who have spent two generations in the United States.  They are elected to 
Congress, they pay taxes, they serve in the armed forces.  I’m sure that some Cuban-Americans will go 
back to stay in Cuba and many others will go back to visit.  But I think a large percentage of Cubans 
now living in the United States after Castro is gone are going to discover that they see themselves more 
like Irish-Americans in Boston or American Jews in New York or German-Americans in the Pittsburgh 
area.”) (statement of Frank Calzon, executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba—an independent, 
non-partisan institution dedicated to promoting human rights and a transition to democracy and the rule 
of law on the island of Cuba). 
252
 See Tug of Two Homes, supra note 250. 
253
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 18. 
254
 Id. at 24; Kevin Manahan, Away From Big Game, Boos for Castro, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 5, 
2007, at 1 (“Miami is home to more than a million Cuban-Americans, and last week a citizens’ commit-
tee announced plans to celebrate Castro’s death with a party at the Orange Bowl.  Let your spite be your 
invitation.”). 
255
 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 24. 
256
 Id.
257
 Id.
258
 See id. at 25.  
259
 See id. at 24.  
260
 See Monte Real, In Latin America, A Warm Spotlight for Socialist Icon, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
2006, at A8. 
261 See id.
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greater ally than Venezuela.262  Cuba, as part of an agreement with Venezu-
ela, sends doctors, teachers, and sports instructors to Venezuela in return for 
over 50,000 barrels of oil per day.263  More recently, Cuba and Venezuela 
agreed with Bolivia to buy all of Bolivia’s soy beans in exchange for access 
to Bolivian oil.264  Additionally, Cuba remains a powerful ally of Mexico,265
while the U.S. continues its non-diplomatic relationship with Cuba.266  Cu-
bans who wish to find refuge from the oppressive Castro government do 
have alternatives in Central and South America.267  The comfort level of 
Cubans in these countries is high, as is the opportunity of sustaining a life 
of quality.268  Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela are Spanish-
speaking countries with ties to Cuba and large metropolitan centers.269
While Cubans may prefer to immigrate to the U.S., the historical relation-
ship that once existed between Cuba and the U.S. is no more, and Cuba and 
the previously mentioned Central and South American countries are now 
closely tied together.270
The above-mentioned hypothetical responses to the concerns from the 
1966 Hearings are similar for the most part to those given in 1966.  Cubans 
remain oppressed;271 the formal process for receiving access to the United 
States is inadequate;272 professionals are being prevented access to the Unit-
ed States;273 and the American stance on Cuba has not changed.274  However, 
at least two of the rationales for passing the CAA no longer carry the same 
weight.  Exiled Cubans in the U.S. do not ultimately intend to return to Cu-
ba;275 and, arguably, Cubans prefer to live in South and Central America 
262
 See Magdalena Morales, Chávez Cultivating Cuban Idea, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at 
A17 (Cuban instructors have offered farming lessons to Venezuelens as part of “Cuba’s latest export to 
its closest South American ally, Venezuela.”  The farming lessons have been criticized as “little more 
than a political gimmick and another sign of Chávez’s close ideological ties with his friend and ally 
Cuban President Fidel Castro.”). 
263
 See The Americas: Another Cuba?; Venezuela, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 47. 
264
 See Anita Snow, Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela Ink Alternative Trade Agreement, BOSTON HAITIAN 
REPORTER, May 2002, at 22. 
265
 See Robert S. Leiken, With a Friend Like Fox, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 91. 
266
 See Pablo Bachelet & Frances Robles, Cuba Cuts Power to U.S. Mission, MIAMI HERALD, Jun. 
13, 2006, at 1A. 
267
 See supra notes 210-216 and accompanying text. 
268
 See Rodrigo Lazo, Promise of Help Still Good, Cubans in Venezuela are Told, MIAMI HERALD,
June 16, 1989, at 4B (Cubans have settled in Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Spain.  Many see their 
time in these countries as temporary stops on their voyage to the U.S.; however, the possibility for 
prosperity outside of the U.S. for Cubans exists). 
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over the U.S.276  The majority of the rationales support the continued use of 
the CAA, but with a minority of rationales no longer supporting the CAA, 
the debate over the continued use of the CAA has grown. 
IV. COMMENTARY - THE FUTURE OF THE CAA 
A. Continued Preferential Treatment of Cubans 
One man felt so passionate about the current state of U.S.-Cuba rela-
tions, or the lack thereof, that in January 2006, after 15 Cuban refugees 
were sent back to Cuba, he went on an eleven-day hunger strike.277  It ended 
only after President Bush agreed to meet with Cuban exile leaders to dis-
cuss Cuban immigration policies.278  This event—to some—exemplifies 
America’s stance on the fair treatment of immigrants; however,  
[t]he allusion is far from reality.  It would be more fitting to say that 
[the U.S. is] very concerned about fair immigration practices only 
when it comes to the Cuban exile community.  For it has been many 
years that Haitian refugees have been neglected and even mistreated 
by U.S. immigration policy.279
Over forty years after the CAA became law, preferential treatment of the 
kind solely demonstrated toward Cuban immigrants may no longer be a 
reasonable practice of American immigration policies.280
At least one possible future for Cuba is consistent with the concerns 
voiced during the 1966 Congressional Hearings.281  Raul Castro’s takeover 
of Cuba likely will be reminiscent of Communist China as indicated by a 
number of trips he has made to China since 2003 to study Chinese econom-
ic polices.282  This likely opens Cuba to some economic change, but also 
supplies the government with a “more forceful hand in denying human 
276
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rights.”283  The standard of living for the average Cuban remains lower to-
day compared to life in Cuba prior to 1990, when Cuba’s paternalistic ally, 
the Soviet Union, collapsed.284 As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
about $6 billion were lost annually.285  Cubans have been left with so few 
options that many hunt and eat the cats off the street.286  Further, the defi-
ciencies in nutrition have caused an epidemic of optic neuropathy, resulting 
in temporary blindness.287
Strife in Cuba is in part due to U.S. policies, i.e., the embargo.288  Eco-
nomic sanctions and the embargo against Cuba perhaps create a duty to 
accept Cuban refugees who flee Cuba due to economic decline.289  The U.S. 
has consistently strengthened sanctions against the Cuban government as a 
means of accelerating democracy on the island.290  As recently as November 
2006, U.S. prosecutors announced the creation of a task force that will in-
creasingly prosecute the import/export of goods to and from Cuba, unap-
proved visits to Cuba, and exchanges of hard currency to and from Cuba.291
Cuba has lost an estimated $4 billion in 2006 due to lost business, cancelled 
contracts, and higher shipping and financial costs.292  Nearly every U.N. 
member nation currently opposes the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but the Bush 
Administration continues to tighten enforcement of the nearly 45-year old 
economic blockade.293  Clearly, there is a negative history between Cuba 
and the U.S.294  Perhaps the continued preferential treatment of Cubans to-
day is a form of compensation for past mistakes.295
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The special treatment possibly continues because Cubans in the U.S. 
have found various ways to become prominent and self-sustainable.296  The 
presence of well-known Cuban-American individuals is a sign of the ability 
of Cubans to assimilate, adjust, and influence the American way of life.  
The same argument, however, can be made for various other immigrant 
groups who do not receive the same immigration treatment or positive at-
tention from the American public or government. 
For example, Haiti, like Cuba, is known for its “politically-tumultuous 
history and . . . abject poverty.”297  Many Haitians made the 700 mile sea 
voyage to Miami, FL in the 1960s to “escape the torture and killings perpe-
trated by François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and his Tonton Macoutes thugs.  
When the dictator died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier, 
continued the terror, and the exodus burgeoned.”298  In 1980, about 25,000 
Haitians arrived in South Florida along with 125,000 Cubans during the 
1980 Mariel boatlift; however, “because of the 1966 Cuban [Adjustment] 
Act . . . the Cubans were allowed to stay while most Haitians were sent 
back.”299
Like Cubans, the Haitians’ only means to reach freedom is via the high 
seas.
300
  More than one million Haitians live in the U.S.301  Over one third 
live in New York’s metro areas.302  An estimated 20,000 Haitians are living 
illegally in the U.S.303  In 1992, an estimated 37,000 Haitians attempted to 
reach the U.S. by boat after a military coup drove Haiti's first freely elected 
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president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, into exile.304 However, “Cuba is the only 
one that has an agreement with the United States regarding the rights of its 
citizens to ask for political asylum.  The Haitians have no such agreement 
and have become disillusioned with what they perceive is a double standard 
on the part of the United States.”305  Similar to U.S.-Cuban relations, it has 
been said that the U.S. is responsible for the economic and political predi-
cament in Haiti.306
Today, “Haitians are the only refugees that are intercepted in the wa-
ters and returned to their country.”307  Further, those that do reach U.S. soil 
have not been subject to the same fate as Cubans.   
On October 29, 2002, over two hundred Haitian emigrants successful-
ly reached American soil; many scrambled in desperation through 
bumper-to-bumper traffic on the Rickenbacker Causeway in Miami, in 
an effort to elude authorities.  Unfortunately touching American soil 
for Haitians means nothing, unless they evade authorities and seek re-
fuge with family, friends, and/or human right organizations.308
In April 2006, “a fishing boat with 43 Haitians, one Jamaican and one Cu-
ban made its way to land at Hillsboro Beach, [Florida].309  The Haitians and 
Jamaican will more than likely be sent back to their countries, while the 
Cuban is almost sure to stay.”310  More recently, on March 28, 2007, over 
100 Haitian refugees boarded a 40-foot sailboat to escape the situation in 
Haiti.311  “Bewildered family members [already in the U.S.] watched as the 
government has warehoused their loved ones in secrecy, behind barbed wire 
in Pompano Beach, [Florida] and sent them back to Haiti one by one.  Pray-
304
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ers to God and voodoo spirits haven’t saved them.  Nor have immigration 
lawyers.”312
President Ronald W. Reagan, on September 29, 1981, proclaimed that, 
“the ongoing migration of persons to the United States in violation of our 
laws is a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United 
States.”313  Today, with the immigration anomaly created by the Wet Foot, 
Dry Foot Policy, Cubans and Haitians are often involved in confrontations 
with the U.S. Coast Guard, but only the Cubans get to stay in the U.S.314
“For many Haitian-Americans, the United States’ preferential treatment of 
Cuban immigrants has gone too far.”315  Additionally, Haitians who do make 
it to the U.S. and evade authorities face a low percentage opportunity at 
gaining asylum.316  Over 21,000 Haitians applied for political asylum be-
tween the years 1997-2002, but only about 1,200 were approved.317  In fact, 
more than 80 percent of asylum seekers from Haiti have been denied asy-
lum since 2000.318  According to one report, one immigration judge in the 
Miami area “denied 97.6 percent of Haitian cases . . . between 2000 and 
2005.”319
B. The Proposal for the Future 
The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 has kept the doors to the U.S. open 
for Cubans for forty years.  It has been lenient at times; it has been re-
stricted at times, but it has always provided a means to freedom for the Cu-
ban people.  A more stringent policy would deprive the U.S. of a most valu-
able resource—eager individuals who are prepared and willing to contribute 
to the American economy, culture, and society.  However, for 40 years, the 
preferential treatment and the lack of attention to other groups has deprived 
this country of such influential persons.  “We are asking the U.S. govern-
ment to give the Haitians the same rights that they afford the refugees of 
other nations,” said Marleine Bastien, director of the Haitian Women of 
Miami.320  “We are asking that all . . . refugees be given [fair] interviews.”321
This country has in a way screened out certain refugees, specifically Hai-
312
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tians, who are in dire need of the aid that has been provided to Cubans for 
over four decades.322
Precedent supports a more lenient and broad immigration policy that 
does not distinguish between a refugee’s nationality.323  In Matthew v. Diaz,
the Supreme Court of the United States distinguished between American 
citizens and aliens, as well as the constitutional protections that apply to 
these groups.324  While the Court recognized that all aliens do not need to be 
treated homogeneously, the main issue of the case was “whether statutory 
discrimination within the class of aliens . . . is permissible.”325  Further, the 
Court’s rationale focused on the nature of the requirement Congress places 
on aliens, i.e., whether the requirement is wholly irrational.326  Courts have 
later interpreted “wholly irrational” to mean a rational basis scrutiny.327  “If 
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some 
legitimate governmental purpose,” the legislation should be upheld.328
Thus, Congress must only be rationale in its discrimination amongst 
aliens.329  But, what if Congress, in discriminating between Cubans and all 
other refugee groups, has been irrational, and after forty years, can no long-
er express a legitimate governmental purpose?  What if the continued use of 
the CAA is justifiable, i.e., the government could continue to express a legi-
timate purpose for allowing Cubans to enter the U.S., but discriminating 
between Cubans and other refugees, specifically Haitians, is wholly irra-
tional?330
It should be noted that the Supreme Court views the admission of 
aliens as the subject which Congress has the most complete power to legis-
late.331  The Court has long viewed Congress’ “power to expel or exclude 
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial control.”332  Further, 
“although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United States 
in extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the 
322
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oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are tradi-
tional and necessary elements of legislation in this area.”333  Congress has, 
however, provided some–not all–refugees with aid, and the Court has res-
pectfully allowed Congress to make distinctions.334  The Court has even 
acknowledged that, “[w]ith respect to each of these legislative policy dis-
tinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a dif-
ferent point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status,” to 
others who deserve it.335  Thus, the issue of extending the use of the CAA 
to, at a minimum, all refugees who arrive to the U.S. by sea is possible ac-
cording to the Supreme Court.336  It requires a shifting of the line drawing.337
However, it is not within the jurisdiction of the Court; rather, it requires an 
additional act of Congress.338
Congress, over the past forty years, has approved of the CAA and its 
preferential treatment of Cubans.339  Inadvertently, it has denied others 
access to the U.S.340  If Congress were to allow, for example, Haitians to 
enter the U.S. in the same fashion as Cubans, neither group would acquire 
an automatic right to permanently reside in the U.S.341  In other words, the 
debate over the CAA arises because of the access granted to Cubans above 
all other refugees, not an actual grant of status.  Immigrant groups seek an 
equitable opportunity to apply for status in the U.S.342
C. Equal Treatment of Cubans and Haitians 
Cubans and Haitians belong in the same immigration class.  Though 
Haiti has received less attention than Cuba, the interests of Haitians and 
pro-Haitian activists sound a lot like those expressed by Cubans.  According 
to former President Clinton, the United States has a “significant interest in 
Haiti.”343  The most obvious and important reason for this interest is Haiti’s 
333
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geographic location.344  Haiti is located in America’s backyard.345  Further, 
the United States is interested in the establishment of order in Haiti.346  In 
part, this interest stems from a history of failed intervention in Haiti347 and 
the effect of U.S. policy toward Haiti.348
A refugee from Cuba and Haiti who takes to the sea in attempting to 
reach the U.S. faces many of the same hurdles: (1) the reality of leaving 
their homeland and loved ones indefinitely; (2) the sea; (3) avoiding the 
U.S. Coast Guard and being subject to the Wet Foot, Dry Foot policy; (4) 
access to immigration relief; and (5) a favorable grant of relief from U.S. 
immigration services.  This general timeline of what a refugee faces does 
not begin to account for the realities a seafaring rafter faces, but it can be 
used to highlight the procedures Cubans face versus all other refugees.   
In terms of the Haitians’ access to immigration relief, only Cubans 
have an automatic right to apply for adjustment of status.349  If a Cuban does 
not meet the requirements set out by the CAA or is otherwise found to be 
inadmissible he/she may not adjust under the CAA. But, generally speak-
ing, a Haitian and a Cuban who face the same persecution in their native 
country, face the same dangers at sea, and seek the same life in the U.S., do 
not receive the same attention under U.S. immigration laws.350  Simply be-
ing Cuban gives rise to a claim for adjustment of status, but being Haitian 
does not.351
Specifically, on the Department of Homeland Security application for 
adjustment of status, section (e) and (f) of Part 2 of the application reads as 
follows:  
(e) I am a native or citizen of Cuba admitted or paroled in the United 
States after January 1, 1959, and thereafter have been physically 
present in the United States for at least one year;  
(f) I am the husband, wife or minor unmarried child of a Cuban de-
scribed above in (e) and I am residing with that person, and was ad-
mitted or paroled in the United States after January 1, 1959, and the-
344
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reafter have been physically present in the United States for at least 
one year.352
The application for adjustment of status does not expressly mention any 
other group aside from Cubans.353
What would the Act look like if it served a wholly rational purpose and 
a legitimate governmental purpose?   
D. The Cuban/Haitian Adjustment Act of 2007 (“CHAA”)
[T]he status of any alien [who is a native or citizen of Cuba and] who 
is a native or citizen of Cuba or Haiti or any other country that the At-
torney General recognizes and who has been inspected and admitted 
or paroled into the United States [subsequent to January 1, 1959] sub-
sequent to January 1, 2007 and has been physically present in the 
United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney 
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may pre-
scribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if 
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is el-
igible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United 
States for permanent residence . . . .  The provisions of this Act . . . 
shall be applicable to the spouse and child of any alien described in 
this subsection, regardless of their citizenship and place of birth, who 
are residing with such alien in the United States . . . .354
The CHAA is not an extension of the CAA, though it may appear like 
one. Rather, it is a fairer and less preferential version of the CAA.  After all, 
Haitians over the past forty years have been subject to far less special 
treatment by U.S. immigration, yet have faced an almost identical persecu-
tion and oppression to that of Cubans.355  In turning to the six concerns from 
the 1966 Congressional Hearings—with a few modifications and revi-
sions—Haiti appropriately and justifiably fits within the grand scheme of 
the CAA.356
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E.  Hypothetical Congressional Hearings on Haitian Affairs and Immigra-
tion Policy 
According to the 1966 Hearings, the Act was passed in order to im-
prove the plight of Haitians.357  These refugees left their home country be-
cause of the oppression of their government.358
Today, Haitian farmers have resorted to eating the seeds that would 
have produced the next harvest of crops.359  Few hospitals and health clinics 
are functional, and those that are, have been filled with malnourished child-
ren.
360
  Haiti is a country of endemic, political violence and a stinging po-
verty.361  Nearly 23,000 Haitians sought to reach the U.S. in the 1980s.362
Today, the “majority of the population . . . teeters on the brink of death from 
hunger, disease, and displacement . . . [and nationals] of Haiti are subject to 
forced repatriation into a country where the government cannot prevent 
immediate threats to their lives, freedom, and welfare.”363  Therefore, be-
cause both Haitians and Cubans are subject to unstable and oppressive go-
vernmental and non-governmental regimes, the plight of both is lessened if 
admitted to the U.S. and given the opportunity to seek status.  
According to the 1966 hearings, the formal process for achieving 
access to the United States from Haiti is inadequate.364  An individual from 
Haiti could not apply for an immigration visa to enter the U.S. from within 
Haiti.   
Today, Haiti and the U.S. do have a diplomatic relationship; however, 
this does not ensure a fair visa application process within Haiti.  Since 
2003, natives of Haiti are not eligible for the Diversity Visa Lottery Pro-
gram (“Program”).365  The Program gives individuals from certain countries 
—not Haiti—the opportunity to register and win a visa to seek permanent 
residency in the U.S.366  Due to the state of affairs in Haiti and the unavaila-
bility of visas, an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status should be 
granted to Haitians and Cubans. 
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According to the 1966 Hearings, professionals and skilled persons 
from Haiti are being denied access to the United States. 367    These persons 
would be a great benefit to American society.368
Today, even with the lack of access to the U.S., Haitians have had a 
great influence on American society and culture.  In 2006 elections, Kwame 
Raoul, a Democrat, was re-elected to the Illinois state Senate 13th Dis-
trict.369  M. Rony Francois heads the Florida Department of Health.370  “The 
suburban Miami, [Florida] enclave of El Portal became, in 2000, the first 
municipality in the United States to elect a Haitian-American mayor, fol-
lowed by North Miami and Spring Valley, N.Y.371  Haitian-Americans serve 
on city councils and municipal bodies throughout the country.”372  Edwidge 
Danticat, author, has successfully written six novels and won various lite-
rary awards including being named one of New York Times Magazines “30 
under 30” to watch.373  Lylah M. Alphonse, journalist, is a news editor for 
the Boston Globe and is also author to a book.  Garcelle Beauvais-Nilon, 
actress, has modeled for various cosmetic lines, but is best known for her 
role on N.Y.P.D. Blue.  Wyclef Jean, musician/producer/humanitarian, has 
explored various entertainment roles while creating his own foundation, 
Yéle Haiti, to aid and rebuild Haiti.  The list of Haitians that have impacted 
American society is not as long as the Cuban list, but this ties back to prefe-
rential treatment Cubans have received over the past forty years.  Addition-
ally, at least fourteen universities in Haiti are currently functional, indicat-
ing that there is a means to education and that the U.S. could benefit from 
allowing these professionals and skilled persons to adjust their immigration 
status. 
According to the 1966 Hearings, the efforts taken by the U.S. to wel-
come immigrants are “humanitarian gestures,” and in no way indicate a 
change in political posture toward the oppressive governments.374  In other 
words, the CHAA is in no way indicative of any agreement with the foreign 
government; rather, it is a form of relief to the oppressed people.375  The 
essence of the American posture toward the foreign country is that the for-
eign country one day return again to the “free world family of nations,” 
367
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368
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while the U.S. government’s doors remain open to those who wish to flee 
the oppression from the totalitarian government.376
Today, the U.S. has remained involved to some degree in the transition 
to peace and democracy in Haiti.  An arms embargo has been in place for a 
number of years in an effort to prevent violent militias from rising against 
the government.377  However, more recently, the U.S. government has les-
sened the embargo to support Haitian police that need aid in keeping or-
der.378  Nevertheless, a U.S. policy that opens the gateway to America for 
Haitians who exit Haiti in search of freedom would in no way be indicative 
of a change in diplomatic stance.  The U.S. would continue to support peace 
and economic prosperity in Haiti.  
According to the 1966 Hearings, as the conditions improve in Haiti, 
immigrants will return to their home land.379  They do not intend to remain 
permanently in the United States.380
Today, this concern, similar with Cubans, is perhaps the least accurate.  
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there were nearly 100,000 Haitians in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida, and nearly 550,000 Haitians in the United 
States.381  An estimated 360,000 Haitians living in the U.S. are foreign 
born.382  A Haitian and Cuban that leaves his/her home country likely never 
completely cuts ties with his/her homeland, but once a new life has begun 
in the U.S., once an immigrant accomplishes what he/she seeks after mak-
ing the difficult voyage to the U.S., return to Haiti or Cuba is not likely.   
According to the 1966 Hearings, immigrants prefer to settle in the 
U.S., “particularly the Miami area and Florida.”383  They know how to live 
with Americans,384 and have less in common with other regions of the 
world. Today, similar to Cubans, this rationale has also grown weaker.  In 
November 2005, “[e]ighteen Haitian refugees who claim that they are flee-
ing political persecution and civil unrest in their homeland, landed in [Ja-
maica].385  In October 2005, fifteen Haitians migrated to Jamaica in search 
of a better life, but Haitian immigration to Jamaica has remained small in 
comparison to the migration toward the U.S.   
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The U.S. government has been determined to protect national security 
and public order through restricting borders and migration.  Government 
officials like former Attorney General John Ashcroft have indicated that 
“Haitian restrictions are a matter of national security–that migrants from 
countries such as Pakistan have used Haiti as a staging point for entry into 
the United States.”386  However, Haiti is not on the U.S. Border Patrol’s list 
of nations considered to be “special interest” for hosting or supporting ter-
rorism.387  More liberal immigration advocates criticize the U.S. govern-
ment for covering up its real intentions, “[not] tolerat[ing] a large irregular 
movement of poor, black immigrants into a politically important state, Flor-
ida.”388  While immigration officials have not publicly admitted to race be-
ing a policy factor, Alex Stepick, director of the Immigration and Ethnicity 
Institute at Florida International University says, “[c]onciously or uncons-
ciously . . . the American policies on Haitians are driven by racism.”389
There is a perception, a misperception, that all Haitians are “pathetic” that 
hails from stereotyping of Haitians based on Haiti being the Western He-
misphere’s poorest nation.390  “If you come here from a communist country, 
it’s OK.  If you come from a white country, it’s OK.  If you come here from 
a black country, noncommunist, it’s not OK.”391
The majority of the hypothetical rationales and responses support a 
Haitian act similar to the CAA granting access to Haitians similar to that 
given to Cubans.392  In recognition of the continued hardship faced by Hai-
tians and Cubans, the level of assimilation exemplified by both, and the 
hypothetical modern Haitian responses to the concerns of the 1966 Hear-
ings, the U.S. should open its doors to both Haitians and Cubans so that 
they may seek adjustment under the immigration laws of the U.S in an 
equal and justifiable manner. 
V. CONCLUSION
What American principles does the U.S. government intend to project 
to the rest of the world?  When dealing with Cubans, the 1966 Subcommit-
tee considered and resolved this concern with the following response: We 
are a nation that encourages freedom and resistance to totalitarianism.393
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We are also a nation of consistency, one that “practices what it preaches;” 
those persons who are hard pressed under totalitarian regimes should be 
extended the possibility of becoming U.S. citizens, so long as they work 
toward the general good and freedom.394  So what is the rest of the world to 
make of the CAA and the preferential treatment of Cubans when denied to 
similarly situated groups like Haitians? 
Cubans are “fine people and they come from good stock,” but so are 
many of the individuals who have been denied the opportunity to adjust 
their status within the U.S.395  Cubans have adjusted well to America, 
worked hard, and are no longer a financial burden to the U.S. govern-
ment,396 but other groups would also be characterized as such if granted 
forty years of preferential treatment.397  The CAA set a precedent; the U.S. 
will open its doors to groups of individuals who, in the opinion of Con-
gress, will benefit our society.398  This once was the “give-and-take” of the 
CAA.  Cubans got access to the U.S., and the U.S., putting aside its viola-
tion of Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the principle of non-refoulement, looked good in the eyes of the interna-
tional community.  Cubans have made the U.S. look great, but forty years 
later, though Cubans continue to make an impact on American society, the 
number of individuals who have been denied the same rights are beginning 
to outnumber and cast a shadow over America’s “special favorites,”– Cu-
bans.  In other words, the benefit of accepting Cubans over all other groups 
is now outweighed by the number of other willing and worthy individuals 
who are as deserving as Cubans, but have been denied access to U.S. 
The recent decline in the health of Fidel Castro has led many in Con-
gress to question the future of Cuban migration.399  The big question tends 
to be, “are the Coast Guard and other Homeland Security agencies are pre-
pared” for another mass migration?400  An estimated 500,000 Cubans could 
flee Cuba if, upon the death of Castro, more unrest breaks out.401  “Even an 
394 See id.
395 See id.
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influx of 50,000 would be too much . . . straining schools, jobs, housing, 
social services and other resources.”402  The list of potential drawbacks to 
any plan implemented to deal with a future influx is long;403 nevertheless, 
the drawbacks spring from the same root–the special treatment of Cubans.  
“U.S. policy allows Cubans who reach American soil to have automatic 
legal status.”404  Those who favor tightening controls on immigration in this 
“already testy national debate” believe the special treatment of Cubans 
should change,405 and that the CAA is “toast once Castro dies.”406
Those who support the continued benefits of the CAA must act fast, 
before the “testy national debate” is inflamed by the next mass migration.407
Many of the concerns from 1966 remain true today and contemporary rea-
soning supports the continuation of the CAA. However, there is no good 
rationale for singling out Cubans over similarly situated persons such as 
Haitians.  Cubans are not the only group risking their lives or living under 
oppressive governmental regimes. 
The rationales from the 1966 Hearings that led to the enactment of the 
CAA are applicable to more than just one group.  Extension of the CAA to 
Haitians does not create a slippery slope between the Cubans/Haitians and 
all other groups.  The similarities between Cubans and Haitians mentioned 
throughout this comment indicate that Cubans and Haitians are inseparable 
for immigration purposes.  Thus, adoption of the Cuban/Haitian Adjustment 
Act of 2007 (“CHAA”) grants access to persons who fall within the original 
intentions of the CAA and current hypothetical rationales, while eliminating 
the “preferential” from the exclusive treatment of Cubans.  Haitians deserve 
the same attention as Cubans.   
Other groups are deserving of immigration access to the U.S., but not nec-
essarily via the proposed CHAA.  The one principle that has no justification 
is the categorical separation of Cubans and Haitians as a result of the CAA.  
The CHAA, applying equally and evenly to a group of similarly situated 
non-citizens, rather than Cubans alone, eliminates the “preferential” from 
the treatment.  The best method for preventing a mass exodus and control-
ling U.S. borders is some form of preventative political measure and com-
promise between diplomatic states, but at this stage in U.S.-Cuban and 
U.S.-Haitian relations, we can either hope that there will never be another 
402
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immigration situation like Cuba or Haiti, or take a corrective approach that 
simultaneously corrects the special one-sided treatment of one group and 
balances the access to the U.S. by providing similarly situated persons, Cu-
bans and Haitian, fair and equal access to the U.S. 
